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The state c .he art m text analysis and text comprehrnsaon research. especially m theoretxal aork 
I” hngwstlcs. pvchology. and art~fw~al mtell~gence. has not gotten much beyond subJectwe 
methods of ara:,ws of critical texts. often of a trwal size and often vzlected because features of 
such texts illustrate nicely the theorebcal point being argued by the analyst This paper represents 
an attempt 1” a‘ 1st texl researchers m sharpening methods of analysts by lookmg for a number of 
dwcourse properues on different levels simultaneously. Close subJe;lIve analysis of longer texts IS 
argued to assist m evaluatmg past ~beortes and dlscovering new classes of dwourse phenomena. 
thus advancmg the state of the arr I” text comprehension research. This paper explores IHO 
chddren’ texts from the standpomt of a plans analysts. a story grammar analysts. an analya~s of 
mformatnon structure. and analyses of problems connwwd wth conjunction. anaphora, and pomt 
of wew. 
1. Introduction 
Ideally, it should be possible to examine a given text using simple, replicable 
methods of evaluation to determine not ?nly the level of difficulty but the 
sources of difficulty such a text presents. But such methods simply do not now 
exist. The state of the art in such matters, especially in theoretical work in 
linguistics, psychology, and artificial intelligence, has not gotten beyond sub- 
jective methods of analysis for any but the simplest kind of text property. for 
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example. IexicJ frequency counts or measures of hentellce length. 
The main purpose of the Text Analysis Group of life Center for the Study 
of Reading has heen IO advance the stale of theoretic: work on proper- 
ties. To this end. we have involved ourselves in M h,it we readily admit is 
\ubJective. hut close. analysis of texts. We do this fc.r three reasons. 
FIrsI. it allows the sharpening of tools of analysis and a determination of 
whtch methods of analysis arc or are not likely IO he usable and fruitful, albeit 
subJectlve and intuitive. As an example. we have attempted a given-new or 
topic-comment analysis of a text. but the methods of analysis we have 
atrempted IO use turnrd out either to be unpossible IO apply to non-trivial 
ICXIS. or when applied consistently. 
outcome shows the of the theories with which such are 
associated further theoretical 
loohing simultaneously several kinds of properties 
classes of phenomena. and IO suggest research on their roles in text comprehen- 
sion. 
Fmull?. we perform our analysis because we are convinced that the state of 
theore!ical \\ork on text properties can be advanced beyond its present form 
oni> h? considering data bases considerably richer than those presently availa- 
Hr. Moat theoretical discussions of text properties are based on a single text. 
often of a trivial size and often selected because features of that text illustrate 
quite mcel! the Ihcoretical point being argued by the analyst. Whether such an 
anJ\\is is aeneralizable to other ttxts is left IO other researchers (who are 
u~uly busy \\lth their own work) or students of the original analyst (whose 
du!, is IO bolster the theory). Research is thus either fragmented or short- 
slghted. in either case a situation that may lead to a stagnation of the field. 
In this paper. our approach has been. for the most part, to assess some of 
the factor5 of discourse comprehension that seem worthy of future study. In 
1977 and 1978. the authors chose two children’s text>. Nu Croww 
(de Brunhoff 1967) and “The Wonderful Desert” (Moore and Mastratto 1959) 
(hereafter BABAR and DESERT). the firsI a narrative text. the second a 
descriptive-expository piece. From the disciplines of linguistics. psychology. 
and artificial intelligence. we charged ourselves to discover “what was there” of 
interest. We analyzed these two texts from lexical-, syntactic-, and text-level 
standpoints, and we also analyzed the illustrations in and layout of the texts. 
This work is reported in full in !hree documelits (Green et al. 1980a. 1980b. 
198OC). 
This paper is a highly edited and condensed version of the text-level section 
of Green et al. 1980a. Section two of this paper treats the analysis of the 
organizational structure of texts and contains comments on how (if at all) this 
structure is indicated overtly to .:ie redder. Section three is devoted lo a 
discussion of a number of text-level discourse properties (information struc- 
lure. point-of-view, corlnective devices and anaphoric devices) and the possible 
relevance these properties have to a theory or theories of text comprehension. 
2. Organizational structures 
-1.1. Ir7lroducrion 
The structural analysis of texts can be carried out at a number of levels. 
depending on the length and type of text. A richly structured text such a\ 
BABAR could possibly bear analysis at as many as four or five levels of 
organization. In the absence of a general and empirically vulnerable theory of 
the structure of texts (cf. Morgan and Sellner 1980 for discussion), it has been 
necessary to turn to pre-theoretical analyses restricted to certain hterary 
genres, analyses like the Plans analysis described in section 2.2. and the Story 
Grammar, discussed in section 2.3, both of which are limited to analysis of 
narrative texts. the latter to narrative fiction. 
2.2. Inrerucling plans unalprs 
If we want to know why some children have difficulties learning to read. we 
must develop a better idea of what they are reading. or could be reading. 
Analysis of texts alone will not tell us what is the best way to help someone 
learn to read, but it makes asking better questions possible. This section. 
toge.ner with the reports, ‘What makes a good story? (Bruce 1978) and 
‘Interacting plans’ (Bruce and Nedman 1978). constitutes one part of the 
larger text analysis effort. 
Understanding the plans and beliefs of characters in ? narrative is clearly an 
important aspect of reading comprehension. The study of such plans is part of 
text analysis because it depends on an exacting study of the way actions are 
described in the text. It is also an analysis of what goes on “between the lines” 
of a text since it considers motivations and reasonings that may trot be 
explicitly stated. 
A plans analysis is particularly appropriate for two of the central questions 
of text analysis: “What is it that makes a given story easy or hard to 
comprehend?’ and “What is it that makes a given story good or bad?“. The 
answers to these questions surely interact. but it is not true that difficulty alone 
determines the quality of a text, nor even its appropriateness for a child whose 
reading skills have developed to a known level. 
2.2.2. 
The basic theoretical tenets of interactive plan analysis and representation 
h:lce appeared in this journal and elsewhere (Bruce 19Rr). and Bruce and 
PJcwman 197X). It is i,;!ui:ivelv clear that the complexitv of stories can differ 
zven when surface byntactic complexity. vocabulary Ie,e’, and passage length 
are held constant. What may differ are the complexit es of the characters’ 
mot1vatmns. zcuons. and goals. A reader needs to be able to infer plans from 
the often sketchy statements of actions and interuom of actors. He or bhe 
musk then be able IO use these ilrduced plans to connect events. There are a 
number of specific abilities a reader would need rn order to understand plans 
in this way. We do not know that these abilities are a major cause of reading 
comprehension difhculties. or even that they form a complete or well-defined 
\et of skills with respect to undrrstanding plans. Rather. they point to areas 
that might be worth investigating. 
Among the complexities are the following: 
( I) Chuqt~s m pht~. Plans in a story can remain fairly constant. like Bahar’s 
plan IO retrieve his crown. or plans may change in response to events. The 
number and magmtude of changes may be a source of difficulty. 
(2) .S~ze O/ plc~t. Plans vary in their inherent complexity. A plan may involve 
a long sequence of acts or may be accomplished by a single act. 
(? I Emhrcltlrrr,q~ of helw/s. Whenever a belief is about another person’s beliefs. 
\me must he able IO shift point of view. Sometimes a story. e.g., ‘Hansel 
dnd Gretel’ (Lucas et al. 1945) requires multiple shifts of point of view, to 
beliefs about beliefs. etc. 
(4) 0nhedd~1g.s uf t~~re~r~oa. Similarly. intentions may be embedded. For 
example. Hansel and Gretel’s parents intend the children to have the 
intention of following them into the woods. 
(5) Dnhe~ldrn~s o~‘p/ut~s. A consequence of the embeddings of beliefs and 
intentions is that one’s plan can be defined with reference to other plans, 
and those plans to yet other plans. Hansel’s stepmother. for instance, tries 
IO block Hansel’s attempt IO block her plan to abandon Hansel and 
Gretel. 
(6) Dqreer o/ rrt~emcrion. When there are multiple actors in a story, their 
plans can be more or less interconnected. Hansel and Gretel’s plans are 
intertwined with their parents’ plans. Each is trying to respond to the 
others and to get the others to act in a particular way. In other stories 
there may be only one character, or characters’ plans may not interact as 
tightly. 
(7) Deceprtm. A story that involves deceprion. e.g.. ‘Hansel and Gretel’, is 
inherently more complex than one that does not. 
(8) Co~J~crr. The number ano types of conflicts among plans in a story may 
also be a source of complexity. In a general sense. we can view actions as 
attempts to reduce conflicts among plans. For example, there is a poten- 
tial conflict between a plan I believe vou to have and the plan I want you 
to have. There is also a potential conflict between ‘t plan I want you to 
believe I have. and the plan I believe you !:elieve I tave. It is not 
necessarily the case. however, that plans of any type can conflict with 
plans of any other types. In fact. the identification of type!, of plans leada 
us to an identification of types of conflicts that can arise among plans in 
interactive situations. This suggests a number of questions about people’b 
recognition of and respons,. to such conflict situations. For example: 
(a) To what extent do people ?f different ages recogmze embedded plans? 
(b) How deep do these embedc’ings go? 
(c) Do the potential conflicts actually arise in all situations? 
(d) How sensitive are people to .he ability of those they are mteracting 
with to perceive such embed ‘:..gs and conflicts? 
(e) How are the virtual plans tdruce 1980: 296) and the conflicts among 
them signaled in text? 
(f) What are the consequences of one’s understanding of different levels 
of interpretation of virtual plans? 
(9) Murnrornmg dr///erenr pornrs of vrew. Having to maintain different poiqta 
of view, e.g., that one character believes X where another believes not-X. 
imposes demands on the reader. In addition to the level:. of embedding 
mentioned above, there may be problems associated with maintaining a 
large number of differing beliefs or maintaining any differences for an 
extended period. 
(! 0) Culrurol presupJoosrrrons. Stories that involve beliefs about character types 
or simply facts about the physical world may place differential demands 
on readers depending on their experiences prior to readin,:. 
( 11) Beliefs oursrde of Wwed be!ief space”. In a normal episode most beliefs 
are “shared” among participants, meaning not only that they both 
believe. but that they believe that the other believes. and that the other 
believes that they believe. The reader can then assume that all knowledge 
is transparent to all. Oftcm, tho@h, one must assume that there are beliefs 
outside of the shared space, not necessarily conflicting beliefs. but beliefs 
that are not known to one or more characters. 
(12) Inference. The number of extra beliefs needed and the amount of deduc- 
tion required to link together actions in a story is also an indication of 
possible difficulties for the reader. 
(13) Explitrtness o/plans. Texts vary in the degree to which they are explictt 
about the plans and intentions of characters in the story. Stories are more 
difficult when the reader has to infer plan structures from the simple 
statements of actions. 
(14) Acr hterurchies. An important aspect of interactirlg plans is that people 
develop them and carry them out in the con’ext of their perceptions of 
others’ actions. The same action can be vlewed at various levels or 
clumped together with other actions. There can be many levels of concep- 
tuaKzation for the same act or sequences of acts. 
Along with complexities of plans. one of the most interesting results of our 
analyses in terms of interacting plans has been the realization of the tightly 
interwoven character of the plans representations. Any representation of 
“meaning” can be viewed as an arbitrary and unsattsfying abstraction from the 
“whole”. but plans seem even less divisible than other facets of meaning. It is 
difftcult. for example, to change one small part of a plan’s representation 
without producing rippling effects throughout the representation. 
A consequence of this holistic property of plans is that a : ngle belief can 
:tssume tremendous importance. In a fairly straightforward fable like ‘The Fox 
and the Rooster’ (reprinted in Bruce 1980: 300-301). the reader’s belief that 
the Rooster believes that foxes like to eat roosters appears to be a crirrd heliej 
for the building of the typical adult interpretation of the story. Some children 
do not seem to hzve this belief and build a different interpretation in which the 
Rooster is an unwitting potential victim of the Fox and is saved through no 
effort of his own by a Dog. 
The lattz, interpretation is internally consistent. and it matches the story as 
well as the typical adult interpretation. Is it therefore also correct? How many 
different interpretations are there ? We may not be able to answer those 
questions. but we can observe that the one critical belief has had significant 
ramtftcations for the interpretation. Consider haw readers with the two inter- 
pretattons would answer the following questions: 
(1) Did the Rooster trick the Fox? 
(2) Did the Fox trick the Rooster? 
(3) Was the Rooster smart? 
(4) Did the Rooster think that the Fox liked his singing? 
(5) Was the Rooster happy with what the Dog did? 
The notion of criiical beliefs seems worth pursuing. It may account for some 
differences in interpretations due to cultural variation found among readers. It 
also needs to be considered when we think of testing for comprehension. 
Fmally, it shol.*s one more way in which the things the reader brings to the text 
are as crucial to understanding as what is “in” the text. 
What do interactive plans analyses tell us about text comprehension? 
Understanding plans in stories is a complex task that may require years of 
expbsure to high quality texts to learn. Consequently. we should expect 
children and adults to understand stories in different ways, simply because 
they have hzd varying amounts of experience. It would not be surprising to 
find examples of understanding at 
indicator of txperience with reading: 
each of the following levels to be an 
(a) Isolured setnence undersrandrng - each sentence is understood but connec- 
tions are not made. 
(b) Islands of undersrandq - local connecttons alnong sentrnces are made but 
no overall pattern is seen. 
(c) Lfmrred plans undersrandrng - basic plans are comprehended, but not 
interacting plans. 
(d) Embedded phns undersrundmg - full understanding of the interactions 
among plans of characters in a story. 
An interacting plans nalysts also gives some gutdes for our expectations 
about developing readers. First, the complextty of plans means that readers 
may understand in different ways. yet still be reading, and hence. learning to 
he better readers. Second. the importance of ‘critical beliefs’ means that 
readers with different backgrounds may butld divergent interpretattons of the 
same texts. Both of these points need to be considered seriously when we think 
of what it means to test comprehension skills. 
This section has two goals. The first is to tllustrate briefly how a specific set of 
predictions about q.ory memo1 y can be made, using a story gramm.u analysts. 
The second is to raise some critical issues about story comprehension which 
have not been directly addressed. 
In the past few years. it has become increasingly apparent L:u models of 
single word or sentence comprehension cannot account for m;ny of the 
important factors affectmg the comprehension of discourse material. Although 
theories of discourse comprehension must eventually explain how these smaller 
units influence the comprehension of an entire passage. an appioach describmg 
the semantic relationships between sentences is necessary. 
In an attempt to extend Bartlett’s (1932) work on story memory. opp’s 
(1958) morphology of the folk tale, and Rumelhrrt’s (1975) Initial schema ’ Jr 
stories, several story grammars have been constructed to describe the structural 
basis of story understanding. A major theoretical assumptton of these gram- 
mars specifies that memory for stories is a constructive process, resulting from 
the interaction between incomrng information and pre-existing cognitive struc- 
tures containing knowledge about the generic characteristics of stories. These 
structures or schemata influence the way a listener will break down incoming 
story information into its component parts. Schemata aid the listener by 
specifying the types of information and the types of logical relations that are 
most likely to occur at various points in a story. It is then assumed that the 
listener can determine whether any necessary information has been omitted or 
whether the correct logical relations have been used to connect the various 
story components. Thus, the major assumption underlying the description of a 
story schema is that comprehension of a story mvolves the use of an r&u/ story 
structure to reorganize, represent, and retrieve incoming information. When 
text structures do UOI conform to the rules spectfied by a story schema, then 
readers or listeners wtll attempt to transform the incoming information so that 
a representation can be constructed :hat adheres mere to the structure of an 
Ideal story schema. 
In several studies on story comprehension. Stein and Glenn have described 
a story schema in detatl and have presented evidence to support several 
hypothe<er concerning the validity of a story grammar (Stein 1978: Stein and 
Glenn 19/7; Stem and Nezworski 1978). A story structure can be described in 
terms of a tree diagram which is a hierarchical network of story categories and 
the iogical relations which connect them. The initial division of a story consists 
of two parts: a setting plus an episode structure. The setting begins the story 
with the introduction of a protagonist and notmally includes information 
ahcut the social, physical, or temporal context relevant to the development of 
the episode. The setting is not part of the episode, as it is not directly related to 
the subsequent behavioral sequence described in the episode. However. infor- 
mati >n in the setting category may constrain the possible types of behavioral 
sequences whtch then occur. 
The remaimng story information in the episode consists of a sequence of 
ftve categories: initiating event. internal response, attempt. consequence. and 
reaction. There are several factors which alert a reader or listener to the fact 
that one category has ended and another has b,:gun. Temporal markers such as 
“one day”. “suddenly”. “finally”, etc., often signal the beginning of a new 
category. Such markers facilitate the breakdo\,<. of stories into components. 
The semantic content of a statement and the rclationshtps among statements 
are, however. just as important i I determining the division among categories 
Thus, readers or listeners mtt*t sometimes infer that new categories are 
beginning or they ma:’ find expl;it markers from which they recognize the new 
category. 
Certain types of information are always contained in the internal represen- 
tation of an episode, and the temporal order of category information and the 
logics: connections between categories are also critical components of a story 
schema. By using the categories described in the schema, the reader or listener 
can make predictions about incoming information. The text researcher, too, 
can make a set of predictions about the nature of story memory. specifically 
with reference to story recall. Although recall does not guarantee an isomor- 
phic correspondence to the underlying representation of story information, it 
does allow an initial assessment of the types of story information thought to be 
most critical in maintaining the semantic coherence of the text of a story. 
Therefore, the next two sections will discuss predictions concerning the types 
of information most frequently recaiied, the types of new information which 
will be added to a story, and the order in which story information will be 
recalled. 
2.3. I. 
A story statement, in most instances, is equivalent to a smgle sentence in the 
text of a story. The sentenc :. however, is nor necessarily the critical component 
for defining whether inforniation can be classified into one or two statements. 
Rather, it is thefunctron of the information within the context of a story that is 
the critical determinant of the unit of analysis. Stories are basically concerned 
with goal-oriented behavior and ideally consist of a sequence of statements 
directly related to the attainment of the goal. Therefore. the types of logical 
relationships existing among story ,tatements in an episode are the critical 
factors in predicting the saliency of individual statements in recall. In story 
studres. occuru/e recall is defined as the production of statements contarnmg an 
extremely close correspondence to the semantic content of the ortginal story 
material. The syntactic form of stcry memory IS less important. If the rela- 
tionships among statements are directly causal in nature and are related to the 
character’s major goal attainment, then such statements have a high proba- 
bility of being recalled. In recall. then, certain story statements assume a more 
important role than other statements. 
Two additional factors are important in predicting the sahency of each story 
statement. The first factor concerns the semantic content of the statement. 
Although two statements may be causally related to one another. the informa- 
tion in the first statement may directly imply the type of information in the 
second statement. In this situation, the recall of the second statement becomes 
‘unnecessary or redundant. A second factor for predicting saliency concerns 
how well a particular story statement matches the type of knowledge acqurred 
about the specific sequence of events bemg presented. Often two statements in 
a story will again be causally related to one another, but the listener WI, recall 
a statement that is an rnregrurron of both statements. or a statement whrch 
ccntains information from which the actual story statements could be inferred. 
Thus, the *emantic content of * statement, as well as the type of relations 
among statements, affects the probability of recalling individual statements. 
In past studies it has been found that certain categories of mformation were 
better recalled than other categories. The categories most frequently recalled 
were major setting statements, initiating events, and direct consequence state- 
ments. Attempts were in the middle of the frequency distribution. while 
internal responses, reactions, and purely descriptive settings were infrequently 
recalled. These results seem to suggest that statements within these latter 
categories are either semantically redundant or not directly related to the 
protagonist’s attempt to attain a specific goal. 
The saliency of story information is also related to the organization of story 
information into higher order units. The episode is the main psychological unit 
in a story structure. Just as there are difterent tyoes of relationships among 
statements within an episode, there are also different types of relations linking 
the episodes of a story. The relationshi; , among episodes also play a critical 
TOIL’ in determining whether story statements wdl he recalled. In many s’ortes. 
such as BABAR. there is one overriding goal stated in the first episode of the 
story. The remainder of the story. then. consists of a number of episodes 
contatmng subgoals that arc directly related to the protagomst’i destre to 
attain the major goal. If an episode contains subgoals directly related to the 
major goal. tt should he v.ell r:cllled. However. there may be eptsodes in a 
story which have only an indirect relationship or no relationship to the major 
goal. Because these eptsodes are “empty” in the sense of being unrelated to the 
goal. they serve httle purpose and are readily forgotten. 
.?.3 .?. 
The next set of predrctions derivable from story grammar ar ctysis concerns 
‘be variables that regulate the abthty of a listener or reader to recall the correct 
temporal sequence of a given story text. Two categories of results will be giv;n. 
If the temporal organization of a story text corresponds to the structure 
described by the grammar. subjects will have little difficulty organizing incom- 
ing tnformation and recalling the temporal sequence of a story text. Even 
chtldren as young as four can recall the current temporal sequence of a story 
text. HoNever. when the text sequence diverges from the order specified by the 
ideal form. listeners have difftculty maintaining the exact order of the text and 
reorganire the story text in several different ways. ways representative of an 
tdealired form corresponding more to the structure described in the grammar 
than to the sequence actually heard. 
If the story sequence in a text is altered by stmply reversing the posttions of 
t%o adjacent statements. subjects rtcall the story in one of two ways: they 
etther rev’erse the two statements so that the order resembles that described in 
an Ideal structure or they insert a causal or tempora! connector to signal the 
fact that an inversion has occurred. When the information in an experimental 
text is moved more than one location away from its “normal” position in an 
ideal sequence. different strategies are used: in this case, subjects either 
interpolate extra material to connect the moved information more ap- 
propriately to surrounding information or they delete the moved information 
‘tltogether. 
Predictions can also be made for more global recall. In many stories there 
are two or three episodes which are sequenced in an arbitrary fashion su-h that 
there IS no a prrnn reason that one eptsode should occur before another 
episode. There is no direct causal relationship linking the two episodes. Here 
the probability of a subject’s maintaining the correct temporal order of the 
episodes in recall decreases markedly. Thus, the type of connection linking 
episodes not only predicts whether an episode will be recalled, but also predicts 
the order in which episodes are recalled. 
2.3.3. 
Although preliminary results are very promismg for the use of a story 
grammar or story schema to understand parts of the comprehensmn process. 
the important work m this field is in the initial stages. There are several rssuc\ 
that still need much more investigation. 
(I) Encoding. To date, most of the studies completed on stories have uwd 
only recall procedures. While recall is important in asbessmg memory as far a\ 
retrieval goes. this methodology does not directly answer questions about the 
encoding process or the actual process of representation. Agam. one of the 
maJor assumptions underlying memory for stories is the proposed interactton 
between incoming information and pre-existing operations and knowledge 
structures. It is not clear at the present time how the interaction of these 
variables differs during encoding and retrievhl. For exanlJ4e. Stein and 
Nezworski (1978) have shown that subJects recall stories in a .ery specrftc 
temporal sequence and will transform incoming informatton ,o that the order 
of output matches the order described in an ideal story structure. However. 
these transformations may occur only as a function of the con\trarnt\ placed 
on working memory during retrieval. The unde-lying representation of the 
story may be more complex and more representattve of the pattern of incom- 
ing information. Both Mandler and Johnson (1977) and Stetn and Nezworaht 
(1978) have stated that although there may be similarities m the proce\\ of 
using schemata during encoding and retrieval. there are also stgmftcant drf- 
ferences. 
One method to show the differences between encoding and retrtev al proces\e\ 
is the use of recognition and probe procedures. Stem and Glenn ( 1977) have 
already demonstrated that certain types of story mfo:matton (internal re- 
sponses), infrequently recalled by chtldren. are very accurately encoded (u hen 
probe techniques are used IO assess comprehension). Stein and Nezuorski have 
also shown that although subjects reorder stories containing vrolations of ‘an 
ideal form, they are aware of the types of violation occurring in the structure of 
a t :xt. Thus. during the process of encoding stories. subjects mcorporate much 
more and different information about the text structure than they are able to 
retrieve. 
(2) Inferences. The difference between the encoding and retrieval of stories 
also raises questions about the actual structure of the representatton of stories. 
One of the most important issues related to the comprehension of stories 
concerns the types of inferences made during the process of encoding and 
representation. Story information often deals with moral dilemmas where 
children continually make inferences about the acceptability of a character’s 
goals, plans. and attempts to attain the goal. That is. inferences arc made 
spontar.eously about whether or not a set of actions dre good or should have 
been performed and whether or not the character is seen as good or had. 
Inferences are also made about a character’s personality traits, affective states. 
and perceptions about some of the story events. 
Although stories sometime\ explicitly state this type of information. more 
often than not the reader must make inferences abUrt this information. 
Because these inferences arc related to the way children apply story informa- 
tlnn IO their own problems and behavior. it becomes critical to begin a more 
detailed investigation of this type of information that is inferred. 
(3) Se~~~rrc~. The more general p*ohlem with existing story grammars is that 
they do not provide a ~~~rr/toJ for understanding the resulting representation of 
the .~pec~f~c >emantuz concept of a story. Although general predictions in the 
Stem and Glenn grammar were made about information salience in recall. 
hahed on the relational struclure created among story statements, thebe predict- 
:ons do not concern the specific content of story material. The development of 
a more encompassmg model 1s necessary. Such a model would lay out specific 
predIctIons ahout the recallabdlty of each specif’z story statement. Although 
\se can bhow. for example. that causal relations among statements and their 
relations IO the character’s goal a-e important. these factors do not allow 
enough specificit) about recall to make fully accurate predictions. 
A final issue which needs investigation concerns the changes which occur in 
stnq structures as a function of age Stein and Glenn, in a study on story 
p~~/~rcrro~ show that story length and the complexity of the story structure 
change P:. a function of age. Young children do not produce certain types of 
stories. e.g.. interactive character episodes, complex goal structures, etc. Now it 
1s necessary 10 determine just how these different structural characteristics 
affect c omorel~ewron. 
3. Discourse propertitj 
This sectkn describes a number of text-level discourse properties that have 
characteristics that may affect reading comprehension. Section 3. I consists of a 
general discusslon of informa:ion structure. which is posited as scaffolding for 
the comprehender to build a model of the text and integrate a memory 
replercntation of the discourse. Section 3.2 is a very brief discussion of 
hnguistic phenomena that reflect the narrator’s or character’s point of view, 
ohenomena that reflect the narrator’s attr mpt to influence the reader’s percep- 
tlon of events described. Section 3.3 contams discussion of two major text-con- 
nective devices: coqunctions and anaphoric devices. 
There has been a great deal of interest recently m the notion of ~~I/oT~~u~~J~I 
conveyed by a sentence, how information is conveyed. what its form 1s. and 
whether the structure of a sentence or discourse is dependent on or reflects the 
information communicated. It has been postulated that comprehension of text 
depends crucially on the ability of the reader to match up the text with dn 
appropriate organization within whkh to interpret the text. In this sectlon. we 
examine a number of the terms used 111 the description of informatlon structure 
schemata (or perhaps sub-schemata), and we evaluate the feasibility and utihty 
of applying such notions to a complete text. i.e.. BABAR and DESERT. 
We begin with the notion ro,-rc. Some authors use this term to mean 
J~ourse toprc, or what a discourse is about. Other authors use it to mean 
setuence roprc, or what a sentence is about. Topics are someumcs vlcwed as 
unexpressed propositions which characterize “aboutness” of a discourse 
(Keenan and Schieffelin 1976). That %, throughout a discourse, toprcs are 
established, and any given sentence will be related to the current discorlr\e 
topic or establish a new topic. There do not seem to be any good tests for this 
kind of discourse topic, and we have found in attempting a partial analysis of 
topic in BABAR and DESERT that the notion “discourse topic” IS in need of 
quite a bit of refinement. 
For other scholars, topics are syn!actic elements. These topic\ are either 
surface constituents in some languages (Li and Thompson 1976) or they appear 
as nodes in a semantic representation that may or may not be s!,ntactically 
realized (Gundel 1977). Perhaps related to topic and perhaps not IS the term 
rheme. This is used variously to mean (1) the pomt of departure of a sentence. 
i.e., the element that comes first m a sentence (Halliday 1967); or (2) ah~t a 
clause is about (Kuno 1975); or (3) those elements in the sentence that are 
already within the hearer’s or reader’s sphere of knowledge. i.e.. information 
that has already been introduced to the comprehender by the writer or speaker 
(DaneS 1974) 
Related to this last notion of theme is another set of terms. g,ce,r and ncn 
r~t/orntarron. Given information is use? to mean the information the speaker 
believes to be present in the (short-term) consciolrsness of the hearer (Chafe 
1976) or what the speaker believes to be recoverable from previous discourse 
(Halliday 1967). Kantor (1977) extends Chafe’s ncltion of a-given-new distinc- 
tion to suggest a concept of degrees 01 acrrootedness of information in the 
consciousness of hearer or reader to explain the cegrees of comprehensibility 
of various referential expressions, e.g., pronominal. demonstrative. definite. 
definite with added descriptors. 
A major problem with’almost all the studits referred to ahove is that they 
give no methodology for the analysis of texts in general Indeed, the analyses 
used to exemplify the theories a !L‘ usually restricted to critical texts composed 
of passages of two to SIX sentences m length. As a result. we find the various 
constructs dtfficuit to apply to actual texts lihe BABAR and DESER.‘. In 
Green et al. (19XOa: 89-95) we attempted to view the BABAR and DESERT 
texts according to a discourse topic analysis, a new-old information break- 
down and a strictly “seat-of-the-pants” approach of “filling in” missing 
Information wtfich. wc hypothsized. was needed to maintain topical connec- 
ttons hetwcen sentences. 
We found our ability to charactertze vvbat was discourse topic in BABAR at 
any given point ut’zrlv futile. In the expository text, DESERT. we were much 
happtcr with our intutttons of what was discoursr topic at what pomt in the 
prcce. But then a perturhing question arose: Is the notion roprc applicable to 
dc\crtptive or expository discourse hut not to narrative? 
Accepting an affirmative answer to this question should cause tire text 
analyst to questton the notion of discourse topic as a lingutstic notion. for if it 
were. it J .jllld he easily applicable to any genre or text-type. Thus. it would 
~~nl f: II~I our analysis that a notion of discourse topic is a fundamental 
comtruct or orgamzing princtple of e.~~oarro~ and so belongs in the cognitive 
rather than the lingmstic rtalm. 
As for old :nea. thcme/rhcme. activated/non-activated distmctions. our 
.tnalyscs were mconclu\tve. We heheve something related to these notions 
cxt\ts. hut the methodology for analyzing texts rn such terms is. from the 
literature and from our albeit meager attempts. entirely inadequate to the task 
of provtdtng a reproducrable analysis of a complete. natural text. Again. more 
dcacriptive work. is needrd on a variety of texts written by authors. not by text 
analysts. 
Finally. our attempts to “fill in” mdssing ipformation to keep a topical 
connection proved to us that text-level inferences are probably the most crucial 
aspect of text understanding. but also the most elusive. We could not even 
come close to systemati7tr.g the kinds of inferences we were able to make, or 
how we made them. The one conclusion we were able to draw was that the 
IcAst Interesting inferences for the study of text comprehension are those that 
follow automatically from a comprehender’s knowledge of the language plus 
the ability IO reason. Inferences that can or nust be made of the sentence III 
r.to/ur~o~r are the same as those one would mak: if a sentence is discourse-initial. 
The hard-to-define inferences are those that involve the relations between 
propositions expressed by sentences and those concerned with what is relevant 
in a discourse. what kinds of inferences are necessary and what kinds are not. 
There are a number of places in BABAR where the author shifts from his 
standard detached and unbiased narratron. Tagging each of these with labels 
would be premature, since the data IO be discussed are mostly one of a kind. 
Further study of real text needs to be made to see if any generahzmons will 
obtain. Here, however, are some of the passages and some rough characterrra- 
tions of them which identify devices meriting further attentton. 
In this first example: 
the author is clearly speaking as if from inside the character’s head. The third 
and fourth sentences especially might well ha-/e been quotes. e.g.. Bohtrr t/ar~X~ 
“I need 11 Iotu&. I must rr’ear II 10 rlre upem’*. 
But nowhere in BABAR is there any thought-quotation; thts seems to combo 
clos ,t: 
“A,,,.,,‘” The nun 
‘The fourth sentence here is interesting because of the phrase “at all”. Agarn. 
the narrator is speaking from the protagonist’s point of view. The phra\e “at 
all” IS oral syntax. and reflects the expectations of the speahrr (i.e.. Bahar). A 
more neutral description of the scene would be accomphshed hy \omethmg like 
“He is not the Mustache-man” or “He turns out not to be the Mustache-man”. 
Linguistic forms like “at all”. which reflect the speaker’s attitude. are perva- 
sive. Analysts of the rhetorical exploitation of such lorms would he greatly 
aided by even a preliminary dictionary of such forms. 
A final example of puint of view is this: 
This statement is clearly a plea directly from the narrator for sympathy for 
King Babar. Also, the word “lost” here reflects the narrator‘s tahmg B,thar’s 
point of view in a subtle way. Previously, “lost” was used only m direct 
quotation of Babar. Here, instead of characterizing Eabar’s thoughts. as the 
narrator did in “He fears his crown is lost forever”. he takes Babar’s point of 
view and simply speaks of the crown as missing. as tf tt were hrs own. 
This section contains discussions of two important elements which function to 
weave the threa Is of discourse in a text into a coherent entity. but wjhich are 
perhaps among the most difficult to describe in full. We speak here of 
coqunctions, which specify relations between the clauses they introduce and 
other clauses or larger chunks of text. and of anuphorrc derrces. which relate 
references to individuals within the text. subject to a set of often subtle 
const~ aints which interact in ways that are not yet entirely understood. 
~ihese devices may affect comprehension by making it more or less difficul! 
for the reader IO reconstruct the structure of the text. so that he or she will be 
able to perform such processing tasks as are necessary for a full appreciation of 
the text. e.g.. forming expectations as to what will come next, picking out 
relevant details in what is being or has Just been processed, etc. Once it has 
been underbtood exactly how these devices reflect and signal information 
ahout structure and other discourse-level properties. it will be possible to 
evaluate texts with regard to them. and it will aiso be possible to establish how 
much of a factor they actually are in efficient text comprehension. 
Coqunctu~ns play a crucial role in providing the reader with information 
both ahou~ the story structure and about the story content. We present here a 
brief list of g.ome of the categories of conjunctions we found in BABAR, 
together with a discussion of what we believe to be their importance to 
JIbcourse analysis and comprehension research. 
The most frequent coqunction in BABAR is hut. Sentence-initial Bur must 
be dl~lingulshed from the use of hur to conjoin parallel clauses within a 
.sentcnce. The latter usage introduces a clause whose content is contrary to the 
expectation that the writer intends to be generated in the reader by the 
preceding clause or clauses within the same sentence. Sentence-initial Bur 
makes a similar contrast. not between the following clause and the one 
Immediately preceding it (which is in a different sentence), but between the 
following clause and possibly some proposition at a higher level of discourse. 
This propositlon may be a stated one. or one which must be i ferred from 
what IS stated somewhere in the preceding discourse. 
We begin our analysis of some of the connective functions of but in BABAR 
with an instance of sentence-initial Bu/: 
Bur here marks the fact that the family expected to find the Mustache-man in 
the Eiffel Tower and, contrary to their expectations. did not find him. The 
expectation that the man would be there was created by Celeste’s statement 
that the Mustache-man might be up in the Eiffel Tower and by the fact that the 
family did indeed go up in the Eiffel Tower. (Note lhat no explicit statement 
that the family went up in the Eiffel Tower for the purpose of finding the 
Mustache-man is made - this must be inferred by the reader.) 
Bur in its next occurrence as a clause-conjoiner requires quite a deductive 
chain to interpret ,roperly: 
To fully comprehend the last sentence, the reader must assume that when one 
IS sad. one generally does not feel like doing something that is enjoyable. or 
perhaps that when one is sad, one does not feel like being around others. Now 
with this as a cultural presupposition. the reader must aiso know or beheve 
that taking a boat ride is supposed to be an enjoyable thing. An instantiation 
of the general cultural presuyposition. then, leads to an understanding of \thy 
Babar’s going along for the ride is contrary to the expectation of the probable 
behavior of Babar. given the knowledge that he is sad. 
The next occurrences are in the following discourse: 
The frrst occurrence of hut is simply a conirary-to-expectation conjunctton. 
which could have joined the clause containing it to the preceding one in a 
single sentence, e.g. “Arthur calls to him, but the nan does not hear him”. The 
second occurrence is somewhat more complicated: Brrr is contrary to expecta- 
tion but is also combined with norm to signal a change in the temporal settmg. 
This hrrr does not crucially refer to the proposition that the Mustachc-man is 
on the bus. but rathe: to an inference that Arthur has faded to get the 
Illustache-man’s attention atid stop him from going away. 
The next httr is different yet: 
Here we have a but of contrast. Arthur has stated that he is glad to see the 
family. This i: a happy event. Now he must tell the f,mily the sad news. that 
the bag got away. Notice that we cannot view this hi’ as contrary to the 
expectations of the family. for if that were the case. Arthur should have been 
able to use a dscourse-rnrtial. “But the red bag got awa I”. Obviously this 
sentence would be anomalous in context. Rather. we must lee the conjunction 
here as contrasting the happy with the sad. 
;t IS also very interesting to look at those contexts where bu/ could be used 
and IS not. and also those contexts which would bc incomprehensible without 
the ~..~njunction. 
We find one case in BABAR where the conjunction buf would fit nicely. but 
is not used: 
Btrr would have fitted qurte niecly as the first word of the last sentence here. 
The situation IS perfect for a contrary-to-expectation conjunction. We might 
wonder whether the fact that the conjunction is not present hinders compre- 
hension. 
In the sentence that we have looked at above, “Babar is sad. but he goes 
along”, the cou;unr:ion ntnsr be included. The discourse would be decidedly 
odd If the two clauses were made into separate sentences with no text 
conJunction uniting them: 
The last two sentences seem entirely unrelated without the conjunction. Clearly 
much more work needs to be done both on the comprehension of sentence 
coanection with and without conjunctions and on the theoretical psycholingu- 
isttc aspects of when conjunctions are required by the comprehender and when 
they are not. This is an almost entirely uncharted area. 
Another interesting kind of text conjunction is one we call a roprc corwecfor 
co~t/tccrrom The sole example in BABAR is: 
up from the subuay. Bahar says nothmg. He 15 very. very sad. And the 
The last sentence here is the one of interest because it really does not relate to 
any of the previous discourse. The Babar family has been chasing the elusive 
Mustache-man all over Paris and has lost him once again in the subway. i he 
topic at the beginnin:: of the passage is clearly Babar’s feelings. We hypothesize 
that the conjunction and of the final sentence serves to unite the final sentence 
with the previous statements about Babar by refocussing the topic from 
Babar’s feelings to feelings of the protagonists in general. Notice that the 
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discourse would sound less connected without the conjunction: 
Sadly they 
very tired. 
Emne up from the subway. Babar wys nothmF. He 1s very. very cad. The chddrrn arc 
The function of the conjunction and is perhaps one of /orcrng the cohesion of 
topic within the same scene. 
Now and rhen, which are traditionally considered to be temporal adverbs. 
may also be seen as kinds of topic connecting or topic establishing conjunc- 
tions. NOW], especially, functions throughout BABAR to convey the informa- 
tion that a new scene or a new event is abet ! to be introduced. I* typically 
introduces a sentence which describes the accompanying illustiaiion. Without 
the illustrations, rather long chains of inferences are required tc connect half of 
the sentences beginning with UOIV with the preceding discourse. Some exam- 
ples: 
Queen Celesle and Kmg Babar pack tlwr crowns. Babar put\ his UOH” I” d httle red big 
The inference must be made that the Babar family got on the train. 
“He may be up I” the Elffel Tower.” says Celeste. “All v,,,tors to P.UIS go up there.” 
NOH. they are up ,n the E,ffel Tower. But the man wth Babar’s bdg 15 nor 
Again an inference that the family went up in the Eiffel Tower must be made. 
Examples like these occur at the beginning of scenes. 
The other HOW’S are more difficult to analyze: 
Arthur runs after him. He waves. He yells, “Come. back Mister’ You haw Bdbar’s crwn! 
The first now is a scene-setting conjunction, descriptive of the illustration and 
requiring an inference that the man got on a bus. The second nou is different. 
It reflects the point of view of the episode-protagonist, Arthur. Whereas the 
illustration-descriptive, scene-introduction now refers to the present relative to 
the reading of the story (that is, it reflects the language a narrator would use if 
the story were being told or read with the illustrations as cues). this norm refers 
to the present time relative to the event being desc ibed. 
The conjunction then provides us with some intentsting properties as well. It 
appears that this conjunction can be used to signal a change or break-up in an 
action sequence. For example: 
They get out :n fronl 01 a markel. “I guess we’ll have to forgel about my C~WVII.” alghs &bar. So 
the chddren begin LO wn and play. They race around. They hide behmd bows. Then they bee 
another man ulth a small red bag. All the chlldren rush abler him 
conjunction in this discourse. the sequence is 
SO the Lhddren begm 10 run and play. They race wxmd. They hide behind hoax They see 
anaher mim wth a srndll red bag. 
A porcrllel~sm is SCI up here with sentences of similar structure and length, i.e.. 
“They race around. They hide behind boxes”. Thus, for the reader to be able to 
comprehend immediately the fact that the children see another man with a bag, 
the author must mark such information as HO/ on a par with the preceding 
sentences. 
Much more work. both theoretical and experimental, is necessary before we 
will be able to describe when or where this kind of marking is required to 
facilitate comprehension. 
3.3.2. Amphrrc deuces 
A major cohesive device in any text is that of umphoric rejerence. or the 
reference of a noun or noun phrase IO some previous mention of that item. The 
simplest forms of alraphora are those of coreferential nouns or pronouns. For 
example. in: 
Queen C’elebte and Kmg Babar pack thew IXOH”S. Babar puts hla cr~un I” a hnle red bag. 
Bohur in the second sentence refers anaphorically to the phrase Ktng Bahor in 
the first. HIS in the phrase his crown also refers to Babar. These anaphoric 
references are ubiquitous in every kind of text. That is. we typically find 
pronominal references following close behind their referents. 
There are in the texts we examined, however, a fair number of anaphoric 
references that ale not so straightforward. In this section, we will give some 
representative examples of these and discuss the problems such uses of 
anaphoric devices may pose for comprehension. 
3.3.2.1. One aspect of discourse that can be studied as part of a text analysis 
program concerns how characters, objects, events, places, etc. are first intro- 
duced into the discourse and then later referred to anaphorically in terms of 
either a definite pronoun or a definite description. Such an analysis can 
provide the data needed to answer many interesting questions about a text, 
including the following: 
(I) What particular assumptions underlie the use OI each definite description 
in a text and ar: those assumptions Justified? (A definite description may 
be used txther to introduce a character, object. etc. or to refer to it 
anaphorically. It is a unique description in that in using It. the 
speaker/writer makes one of two general assumptions. One assumption IS 
that there is one and only o:ie discourse entity which the listener/reader is 
already aware of and would associate with !hat description. The other 
assumption is that in using it, the listener/reader knows that there is (or 
can be) only one object so describable and creates a unique clrscourse e~lrr!, 
accordingly. Given the f&t general assumption, a reference analysis can be 
used to identify both the reason that the speaker/writer assumes a defimte 
description will pick out any discourse entity the listener/reader is aware 
of and the reason that it can discriminate among all those so known. Given 
the second ienernl assumption, a reference analysis can be used to identify 
what know,edge of the world or of English the listener/reader must 
possess in order to guarantee such uniqueness.) 
(2) To what exlent are the characters, objecls+ etc.. separable. on the basis of 
the descriptions given or derivable from the text? (Low separability may 
lead to confusions.) 
(3) What is the rate at which discourse entities are introduced? (Too many m 
rapid succession may bz too great a load on processing ar.d/or memory.) 
(4) How much text intervenes between a discourse entity’s mtroductlon and LL 
subsequent anaphoric reference to it? (If the gap is large. there may be 
insufficient content to the anaphoric expressio.1 to find the intended 
entity.) 
(5) At any given point in the text, which discourse entities does the 
speaker/writer assume the lis:ener/reader is focussed on such that thev 
can be accessed via the minimal cues of definite pronominal reference? If 
then= are several entities accessible via the same pronoun. on what bawls 
(comextual and/or inferential) does the speaker/writer presume the 
listener/reader can identify the intended referent? (This is the pronoun 
resolution problem discussed at length in the artificial intrlhgence and 
cognitive psychology literature (cf. Charniak 1972; Winograd 1972: and 
Chafe 1976; Kantor 1977, among others.) 
This section is based on a preliminary analysis of BABAR. In this initial 
work, we have locussed on the first question above. since any of a wide range 
of skills and knowledge - syntactic. semantic, factual. etc. - may be called 
upon to justify a particular definite description. 
The analysis is based primarily on research reported on in Nash-Webber 
(1978a. b). Before df.scribing our method of analysis and its application to 
BABAR, it would br: useful to understand some of the fundamental assump- 
tions guiding our approach to research on reference. The central notion is that 
of a discourse mode/. We assume that one objective of discourse is to com- 
municate a model. The speaker/writer has a model Iof some situation and 
wishes to communicate this model to a listener/reader. Thus, the ensuing 
discourse is. at one level of interaction. an attempt by the speaker to direct the 
listener m synthesizing a similar model. (In this sense, we are equating 
“understanding” with “synthesizing an appropriate model”.) 
Informally. a discourse model may be described as the set of entities 
“naturally evoked” by a discourse and linked together by the relations they 
participate in. These are the discourse entities that were mentioned above. Ir 
order to understand what we mean by the notion of entities “naturally evoked” 
by a discourse. consider the following sentence: 
Each 3rd grade girl brought a brick to Wendy’s house. 
Then consider each Lontinuation below. In each case, the referents of the 
definite pronoun (e.g.. “she”. “it”. “they”) would be an entity “naturally 
evoked” bv the fitst \rntence: . I 
(a) She certamly was .rtrprised. 
Sire = Wendy 
(b) They knew she would be surprised. 
7/1<r = the set of 3rd grade girls. 
(c) She piled them on the front lawn. 
them = the set of bricks. each of which some 
Wendy’s house 
(d) She was surprised that they knew where it was. 
II= Wendy’s house 
(e) Needless to say. it surprised her. 
II = the brick-presenting event 
3rd grade girl brought to 
Now a speaker/writer is usually not able to communicate at once all the 
re!evant properties and relations of these discourse entities. That task requires 
mrriiiple acts of reference. The speaker/writer may refer to an entity in the 
drscourse model in two ways. One way is with a definite pronoun. In using a 
definite pronoun, the speaker/writer assumes (I) that on the basis of the 
discourse thus far. J similar entity will be in the listener/reader’s (partially 
formed) model; and (2) that the listener/reader will be able to access and 
identify that entity via the minimal cues of pronominal reference. The referent 
of a definite pronoun is thus an entity in the speaker’s discourse model which 
is presumed to have a counterpart in the listener’s discourse model. Alterna- 
tively. the speaker may refer to an entity in the discourse model by construct- 
ing a description of it in terms of some or all of its known properties and/or 
relations, e.g., a definite description. 
So while a discourse entity E can be the referent of a definite anaphor A, we 
consider A’s antecedent to be a unique description of E conveyed to the 
listener by the immediately preceding text. The relationship between the 
discourse on the one hand and the referents of definite anaphora on the other 
IS thus a direct one, mediated by the discourse participants’ models. 
It is our belief that one can formalize, at the sentence level, rules for 
deriving unique descriptions of the discourse entities evoked by a text. A 
preliminary set of eleven formal rules which are sensitive to such aspects of a 
sentence as how each noun phrase is determined. what the relative scope of 
each quantifier is. and what dependencies exist between noun phrases due to 
relative clauses can be found in Nash-Webber (1978a. b). As given there. the 
rules do not taken into account tense. modality, belief and deontic contexts. 
and certain aspects of negation. all of which can be shown to be necessary 
factors in forming appropriate unique descriptions. However, in performing 
our preliminary reference analysis, we have intuitively extended the rules to 
cover these aspects as well. 
As an example of these rules, consider the following one, RW-I. which 
applies to propositions in which a singular existential quantifier (I.e.. a singular 
indefinite noun phrase) has the widest scope. 
(RW-I) If a proposition S, is of the form 
(3.x: A). Px 
then it follows that 
(3.x).~ = i:: Ar & Pz & evoke S,. : 
i.e., informally, if a proposition states that there is a member Y of class A for 
which P is true, then there exists a discourse entity describable as “the A which 
Ps which was mentioned (or evoked) bv the proposition”. (Here I stands for 
Russell’s definite operator, iota.) Sine :que description can be ascrrbed to 
this discourse entity, jt can be referreo . .th a definite anaphor. 
T:iere are many places in BABAR whete the application of this rule. RW-I. 
act unts for both the existence of a new discourse entity and an appropriate 
nique description for it. A particularly straightforward example is the first 
sentence of page 20 of the story, which we shall label (20.1) for convenience. 
(20.1) The boat is going toward a bridge. 
As a first approximation - that is finessing 
sentence (20.1) can be represented as 
(3x:Bridge). Going-toward b,, x. 
the semantics of “going toward” - 
where 6, is a unique label for the discour-e entity referred to anaphorically 
with the definite description “the boat”. Since this matches the left-hand side 
of rule RW-I. it follows that 
(3.1,) ‘.r = I:: Bridge 2 & Going-toward h,. z & evoke qz,, ,). z. 
IX.. there exisls an individuai discourse entity uniquely describable as “the 
brrdge which was mentioned in sentence (20.1) which the boat was going 
toward”. This is the discourse entity referred to anaphorically via ‘he definite 
description “the bridge” in the very sentence: 
(20.2) Suddenly Zephir shouts. “Babar, look! Up on the bridge.” 
This kind of reference analysis allows us to make some interesting com- 
ments about the readabdity of a text. In particular. we will focus on the 
Justifiability of definite descriptions (question 1 above). As stated, the rule 
RW-I gtven earlier is only applicable when an existential noun phrase is 
understood IO have a wide scope over a sentence. (To put this more simply. 
though less accurately. the listener,/reader understands an existential as having 
uide scope under the assumption that the speaker/ writer has some particular 
I m mind which nevertheless cannot be referred to as “the x”. since it is not 
umyue.) With this in mind, it is clear that the rule RW-I is not applicable to 
the second sentence on page 6 of BABAR: 
(6.2) The Babar family is waiting for a taxi. 
This does no, mean that they are waiting for some particular taxi, but rather 
that they are uaiting for any one that comes along. In other words, sentence 
(6.2) should nor evoke a discourse entity uniquely describable as “the taxi 
mentioned in sentence (6.2) which the Babar family is waiting for”. But now 
consider the \ery next sentence of text: 
(X.1 ) The taxi takes them to their hotel. 
How might the writer justify this definite reference to “the taxi”? This phrase 
cannot refer to the particular taxi the family is waiting for, since it is not the 
case that they are waiting for a particular one. However, the author may be 
assuming that the listener/reader will infer that if the family is waiting for a 
tsri. then eventually it will be the case that a taxi picks them up. This latter 
ser,tence. “A taxi picks them up”. does imply the existence of a discourse entity 
unicluely describable as “the ‘just-mentioned’ taxi which picked them (= the 
Bab, r family) up”, which is presumably the referent of the definite anaphor 
“the axi.” Thus, the use of this definite description is motivated by the writer’s 
assun ption that the listener/reader both can and wdl make this plausible, 
world Lnowledge-based inference about the eventual appearance of a taxi. 
Such inferences may demand a high level of sophistication and familiarity with 
the real world and thus strain the listener/reader’s ability to follow the text. 
3.3.2.2. In this section we take up in more detail two of the questions posed 
at the beginning of the previous section, and introduce an additional aspect of 
discourse reference which r, ight be expected to be a source of difficulty in 
comprehension. We comment first on the subtleties of beginning to solve 
question 4, how much difference distance between a pronoun and its referent 
makes. Then we consider certain intricacies of the resolution problem, question 
5. 
As mentioned in the preceding analysis sectio , anaphoric reference by 
pronouns may lead to comprehension difficulty if I ;z pronoun referent IS too 
far removed in time or topic from its original referent, as in this made-up 
discourse: 
John IS one of my best Inends. And his sister. Suzmna. IS one of the best tenms player?. ‘,I the 
country. In fact, she might even make the lnlerna~~onal CWCUII thn year If her luck holdc out. She 
JUS, has to wm one more tournamenl I” Cahforma, and then she’s a cmch to be tnwted. Anyway. 
as I was saymg. he is one of my best friends.. 
Here, the pronoun he in the final sentence is not very comprehensible after all 
the information about a different topic, namely Suzanna, has been presented. 
Notice that in no way can the pronoun reference be said to be ambiguous - 
John is the only possible referent. Still, the time and topic shift may cause 
comprehension problems. 
In BABAR, we find many, many pronoun references. For the most part. 
these references follow closely in time the lexical noun phrases that they refer 
IO, as in this passage: 
Arthur cbmbs out of the waterJust as fasl as he can. He IS all wet. He sees the man wth the bag. 
Arthur calls to him. He is walking away. Arthur runs after hm. He WBWS. He yells. “Come back. 
Mister. You have Babar’s crown! ’ 
With an understanding of the situation, the reader has little if any dtfficulty 
interpreting the referents of the he’s and him’s 
But there is one class of pronoun references that one would suspect, on the 
basis of distance between references, would cause comprehension difficulties. 
but which do not in fact do so. This has to do with the references of the 
pronc.m rhey. In this next example, which stretches over five pages: 
They all follow him, shouting. “Slop, please. Mr. Mustache.” 
Too late! Stuck again! The gales at the bottom of the stairs snap shul. 
“Bring back my crown!” shouts Babar. But the ma” gets on a fra,“. and the tram goes ah;, 
Sadly. they come up from the subway 
there is quite a bit of intervening material between the two rhqr’s. We 
hypothesize that the reason the second occurrence of the pronoun seems so 
immediately comprehensible is that the notion of “the Babar family” is highly 
topical, in that the concept of the Babar family is central to the story and 
always kept in mind. Thus. almost any reference to the family in any way, even 
with a pronoun. may be expected to be easily understood. unless there is a 
competing discourse entity that is also highly topical. 
We now take up a subcase of the resolution problem which we call 
contextual ret/efinmon. As an example of this, let us examine the use of the 
phtase. “the children” in BABAR. In this first passage from early on in the 
boot.. wc see the phrase referring specifically to three individuals - Porn. Flora. 
and ,\lexander: 
But we rind a different referent in the following passage later in the text: 
Here chi/&~~. at least by the second mention. seems to refer to all five of the 
younger protagonists. This point may be argued here. but not in another 
example even farther into the story: 
Now exactly who has been running and playing in the market or who is tired is 
not terribly crucial to the story. Nevertheless. the contextual redefinition of 
particular lexical items is seen in these examoles. Uses of the same lexical 
phrase for different references is a possibility in general and can lead to 
ambiguities or confusions of reference. The same problem of contextual 
redefinitton is also a posstbility, perhaps more so for pronouns. Thus, the 
resolution problem remains one of the most difficult to solve for text analysts 
who look at language comprehension. 
4. Conclusion 
Our study of BABAR and DESERT was most rewarding for the questions it 
raised rather than for the answers we attempted to provide. We have not really 
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arta!vred BABAR and DESERT; rather, we have assessed various approaches 
to text analysis. using BABAR and DESERT as our points of departure. 
Had we chosen other texts, we might have focussed on different text 
properties or organizational schemes. We suspect however. that our main 
conclusion would have remained the same: There is much to be described and 
much to be questioned in doing text analysis and comprehension research. 
There is no one “correct” theory or method of analysis; researchers mt_.’ 
recognize that proposed L,;malisms of discourse analysis or theoretical co* 
structs of discourse are based. as far as we can see, on subjecricz methods of 
analysis and description. 
We are indeed advancing the state of the art, but what we are dc: q IS art, 
until we better understand our tools and methods of analysis and until we hsve 
examined more fully how the mind of the text comprehender intereacts with 
the richness of language and the text itself. 
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